How much rationality?
I. Decision Lab: when does calculation stop being enough?
Move the three variables. The page estimates how much judgment the situation requires. This is not an empirical model. It is a conceptual instrument for seeing why “more calculation” is not always the same as “better reasoning.”
Model completeness
How much of the relevant state space and causal structure is actually represented?
Uncertainty
How unstable, noisy, or genuinely unknowable are the relevant conditions?
Stakes
How costly is a locally sensible but globally mistaken action?
Judgment load: /100
Talebian amendment
When ruin is in the possibility space, expected-value optimization can become the wrong objective. Survival, optionality, reversibility, and margin of safety become epistemic virtues.
Toulminian amendment
Even absent ruin, case-sensitive judgment becomes necessary once formal criteria leave too much out. The issue is not anti-rationality, but the limits of rationality as a total method.
II. Three modes of judgment
Once the lab clarifies the environment, the next question is: what kind of judgment does the case call for? These three modes are not simple rivals. Often the later modes contain the earlier as subordinate instruments.
Make the rule explicit
Prefer formal criteria, consistency, universality, and transparent derivation.
Best when the state space is stable and the objective is clear.
Fit the rule to the case
Prefer proportion, context, exceptions, and practical adequacy.
Best when formal rules underdescribe the situation.
Judge what matters here
Integrate ends, salience, timing, character, and situational particulars.
Best when even the right objective is partly at issue.
Test a case
Tax calculation
III. Approaches to reasonableness
Choose the failure mode
Toulmin
Move: fit reasons to the case rather than force the case into universal rules.
Context, warrants, exceptions, practical adequacy.
Dewey
Move: test ideas by using them to resolve concrete problematic situations.
Inquiry, experiment, consequences, reconstruction.
Rorty
Move: abandon the hope for a final vocabulary.
Recontextualization, contingency, anti-foundationalism.
Joas
Move: treat action as creative and ends as emergent.
Embodiment, situation, value formation, non-teleological action.
Chapman
Move: replace totalizing systems with context-sensitive participation.
Nebulosity, pattern, participation, anti-eternalism.
Taleb
Move: treat hidden tail risk and model error as central.
Robustness, optionality, asymmetry, anti-fragility, ruin-avoidance.
| Thinker | Primary enemy | Unit of correction | What replaces certainty? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Toulmin | Formalism detached from cases | Argument / judgment | Reasonableness |
| Dewey | Spectator theory of knowledge | Inquiry / situation | Experimental warranted assertibility |
| Rorty | Representational foundationalism | Vocabulary / conversation | Recontextualization and solidarity |
| Joas | Teleological action theory | Embodied action | Creative adjustment |
| Chapman | Eternalist system-building | Participation / pattern | Flexible engagement with nebulosity |
| Taleb | Fragile optimization under hidden tail risk | Exposure / system design / decision posture | Robustness, optionality, ruin-avoidance |
One wrong question
“Which is superior, rationality or reasonableness?” is confused. Formal rationality is often indispensable. The live question is how far it carries before the remainder must be absorbed by contextual judgment, practical wisdom, or robustness.